Taxation by Siegel, Fred
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 3
1963
Taxation
Fred Siegel
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Fred Siegel, Taxation, 14 W. Res. L. Rev. 474 (1963)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol14/iss3/22
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
In Leach v. State5 it was decided that an employee placed on leave
of absence because of pregnancy, the request for leave having been made
only after advice that her employment would be terminated, had not vol-
untarily removed herself from the labor market and, thus, was entitled
to unemployment benefits during the early stage of her condition, while
her ability to work continued.
In Ferreli v. Leach'8 it was held that an employee had quit, where the
choice of whether to retire at age sixty-five was in effect left up to the
employee and he chose to accept retirement."z
In Davis Cabs, Inc. v. Leach 8 it was held that a taxicab driver who
leased a taxicab and dispatch service from a taxicab company was an inde-
pendent contractor and not an employee of the company within the mean-
ing of the Unemployment Compensation Act. The lessor company exer-
cised no control over the operation of the cab and the driver simply paid
a percentage of his fares for the use of the cab.' 9
EDWIN R. TEPLE
TAXATION
PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX
The treatment of both distributed and undistributed portions of capi-
tal gain and ordinary income realized by a "tax-option" corporation' in
computing the Ohio intangibles tax has apparently been determined in
Michael v. Bowers.2 The taxpayer was the owner of 666 shares of stock
in an Ohio corporation, herein called Crane Company. The shareholders
of Crane Company had elected to be taxed for federal income tax pur-
poses under the provisions of Sub-chapter S of the Internal Revenue
Code' which in substance allows the income of the corporation to be
15. 184 N.E.2d 704 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
16. 186 N.E.2d 868 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
17. Under the collective bargaining agreement referred to in the court's opinion, employees
normally retired at age sixty-five but were permitted to continue working until sixty-eight,
with the consent of the employer and the union. The claimant in this case, upon reaching his
sixty-fifth birthday, was notified that he would be retired and left without protest or without
specifically requesting permission to continue working in accordance with the terms of the
agreement. The court suggested that the result would be different if no choice in the matter
had been afforded him, with which position the author agrees. See Quick Mfg., Inc., 39 Lab.
Arb. 1003 (1962), for an arbitration award that age alone is not just cause for discharge.
18. 115 Ohio App. 165, 184 N.E.2d 446 (1962).
19. The definition of "employment" in the Unemployment Compensation Act of Ohio, like
that of a number of other states, contains a special clause setting forth three specific tests for
the purpose of determining coverage in situations like this. However, this provision has been
rendered ineffective by the decisions of the Ohio courts. For a discussion of this subject, see
Teple, The Employer-Employee Relationship, 10 OHIO ST. L.J. 153 (1959).
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treated as the proportionate income of the shareholders, whether dis-
tributed or not, and capital gains of the corporation to be taxed to such
shareholders as their individual capital gains. In 1958 Crane Company
had realized capital gains of $48.32 a share resulting from the sale of
stock of another corporation held by Crane Company and ordinary in-
come of $2.98 per share, $1.30 of which was not distributed by Crane
Company to its shareholders. During 1958 Crane Company distributed
$50.00 a share in cash to its shareholders. On her 1958 federal income
tax return, the taxpayer properly reported capital gains of $48.32 a share
and ordinary income of $2.98 a share. On her 1959 Ohio personal
property tax return, the taxpayer elected to use the federal-election
method4 in reporting her investments yielding income. The taxpayer
listed her capital gains and the undistributed part per ($1.30) share of
Crane Company's ordinary income on the federal-election form5 and
claimed that only the distributed portion of the ordinary income ($1.68)
a share was income yield upon which the personal property tax should
be computed. The Tax Commissioner determined that the undistributed
ordinary income as well as the capital gains received by Crane Company
should be included in calculating income yield for Ohio personal prop-
erty tax purposes. The determination was affirmed by the Board of
Tax Appeals.
On appeal the Ohio Supreme Court considered the nature of the
Ohio personal property tax stating that it was not an income tax, but
was a property tax, the value of such property being measured by the
yield or income. The taxpayer contended that since she elected to use
the federal-election method instead of the alternative method6 of listing
her investments and their income yield, and since the capital gain re-
ported was not dividend income for federal income tax purposes, it should
be excluded. The supreme court held that Ohio is not bound by the
federal classification of this income and concluded that the taxpayer's
receipt of the capital gain was income yield and properly includable in
the valuation of her stock under Ohio personal property tax law. The
court further held that since the taxpayer had chosen the federal-election
method of reporting, the undistributed income must also be included as
income yield in the tax assessment against the taxpayer. As authority
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §J 1371-77. Corporations may elect not to be subject to federal
income tax. Where such election is made, the shareholders of such corporations include in
their own income for tax purposes the current taxable income of such "tax-option" corporation,
both the part which is distributed and that which is not. The special characteristics of capital
gains carry over to the shareholders.
2. 174 Ohio St. 169, 187 N.2d 890 (1963).
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 1371-77.
4. Omo Ray. CODE § 5711.10.
5. Ohio Department of Taxation Form No. 912.
6. OrIo REv. CODE § 5711.22.
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for this conclusion the court cited Deeds v. Evatt7 where the supreme
court held that a taxpayer who chooses the federal-election method of re-
porting his investments may not deduct from the total amount of income
shown in his federal income tax return the value of a dividend in stock
taxable under federal income tax law, and that a taxpayer who chooses
the federal-election method may not modify the taxable aggregate of in-
come from investments shown on his federal tax return by applying the
definition of "income yield" under the alternative method of listing
investments and their income. At the end of its opinion the court
properly noted that had the taxpayer chosen to list her investments and
their income instead of reporting under the federal-election method, the
undistributed ordinary income reported by the taxpayer in her federal
tax return would not have been included in determining the taxpayer's
personal property tax.'
In another case' ° involving the federal-election method of reporting
productive investments, the taxpayer during the year 1959 had owned
certain stock in an Ohio corporation, which stock was exchanged under a
plan of reorganization for stock of a Delaware corporation, and the Ohio
corporation was dissolved. During the year the taxpayer had received
dividends from the stock of both corporations and had used the federal-
election in filing his 1960 personal property tax return including all
dividends received during 1959 from both corporations. The Tax Com-
missioner determined that the dividends of the Delaware corporation
should be eliminated from the income yield and that the Delaware
corporation's stock should be listed and assessed as nonproductive since
such stock had not been outstanding for the full calendar year proceeding
the date of listing." The Board of Tax Appeals found for the taxpayer
upon the authority of the Deeds case"2 and held that neither the taxpayer
nor the Tax Commissioner has any authority to remove from the federal-
election return any investment which produced income taxable under
federal income tax law.
SALE~s TAx
The question of whether the sale of items used in making deliveries to
retail customers is exempt from the sales tax was determined by the su-
7. 138 Ohio St. 567, 37 N.E.2d 581 (1941).
8. OHIO REV. CODE § 5701.10.
9. See Michael v. Bowers, Ohio B.T.A. No. 46723 (Jan. 31, 1962), 3 CCH OHIo TAx REp.
5 200-249 (1962).
10. Fisher v. Bowers, Ohio B.T.A. Nos. 49127-49133 (Oct. 5, 1962), 3 CCH OHIO TAx
REP. 5 200-345 (1962).
11. OHIO REV. CODE § 5711.22.
12. 138 Ohio St. 567, 37 N.E.2d 581 (1941).
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preme court in Lakeside Truck Rental, Inc. v. Bowers.13 This case involved
a deficiency assessment against the taxpayer due to non-payment of sales tax
on rental charges paid by furniture dealers to the taxpayer for trucks used
in delivering items sold by those dealers to their retail customers. The
taxpayer contended that the trucks so rented were used by the dealers
directly in the making of sales at retail, and accordingly, the rental pay-
ments were exempt under Ohio Revised Code section 5739.01 (E) (2).
The court referred to section 5739.01 (B) which defines a "sale" for sales
tax purposes and clearly indicates that there is no such "sale" until there is
a transfer of either possession or title. The court determined that unless
otherwise specified, tide to items sold at retail will not pass until delivery
if the contract of sale requires the delivery of the items sold. Since delivery
is an essential part of making a retail sale under such a contract, a truck
used directly in making such delivery is used "directly in making retail
sales,"14 and rentals for such trucks are exempt from the sales tax. The
supreme court reversed the Board of Tax Appeals and remanded the case
for further findings as to the question of delivery.
An interesting fact situation and conclusion is found in Recording De-
vices, Inc. v. Bowers." The taxpayer was in the business of producing and
installing door locking and recording devices on doors of various Ohio
business concerns so that management could determine when and by whom
the doors were locked or unlocked. The taxpayer made a monthly charge
for this service and did not collect sales tax, believing that this was a per-
sonal service transaction. The taxpayer had relied upon a specific ruling
by the then Tax Commissioner of Ohio given in 1938 upon its request
to the effect that the taxpayer was rendering a service and did not need to
collect sales tax. The ruling was never rescinded, amended, or modified.
Though the Board stated that the ruling was erroneous, that the equitable
principle of estoppel could not operate against the State of Ohio, and that
the Tax Commission of Ohio could not be bound by the acts or opinions
of employees, it held for the taxpayer. The Board stated that an adminis-
trative ruling, if long continued, should be given great weight, and held
that the taxpayer was entitled to rely upon such ruling until it is rescinded
in writing by the Tax Commissioner.
FRANCHISE TAXES
In Northern Estates Corp. v. Bowers"6 the taxpayer was engaged in
the construction of homes, some of which were sold for a partial payment in
cash with the balance of the sales price being represented by a second
13. 173 Ohio St. 108, 180 N.E.2d 140 (1962).
14. Oi-o REv. CoDH § 5739.01(E) (2).
15. Ohio B.TA. No. 48148 (July 25, 1962), 3 CCH OHIO TAx R n. 5 200-312 (1962).
16. Ohio B.T.A. No. 49084 (Feb. 5, 1963), 3 CCH OHIo TAx REP. 5 200-373 (1963).
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